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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RALPH BRUNYER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah
corporation, and DANIEL
NEIL IPSON,
Defendants, Appellants
and Third-Party Plaintiffs,

No. 14267

vs.
EMIL ZIGICH,
Third-Party Defendant
and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a case arising out of an automobile accident
resulting in a death and personal injuries.

Plaintiff, Ralph

Brunyer, brought the action against defendant, Salt Lake County
and Daniel Neil Ipson, for his personal injuries and the wrongful
death of his wife, Louise Brunyer.

Defendants and third-party

plaintiffs, appellants in this appeal, filed a third-party complaint
asking for contribution against the driver of the vehicle in which
the plaintiff Brunyer and his wife were riding at the time of the
accident, the respondent in this case, Emil Zigich.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
As a responsive pleading to the third-party complaint for
contribution filed by the appellants, respondent Zigich filed a
motion to dismiss (R.74-75), upon the grounds that appellants had
no cause of action in contribution under the law applicable to this
case.
The matter was orally argued and memoranda of points and
authorities were submitted by each party (R.107-117) (R.76-92).
On September 16, 1975, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft granted
respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that the appellants' claim
for contribution under the relatively recent adoption of comparative
negligence by the Utah State Legislature did not apply to this case
in that the accident for which the appellants seek contribution
occurred before the effective date of the Comparative Negligence Act.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial Court's order of
dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The automobile accident that gave rise to the instant
lawsuit occurred on April 14, 1973, at Gregson Avenue and Main Street
in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Respondent Zigich was driving the plaintiff,

Ralph Brunyer, and his wife Louise home after an evening at the
Zigich residence.

Mr. and Mrs. Brunyer did not compensate Mr. Zigich

for his ride and were otherwise in the status of guests as to
respondent Zigich.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The appellants1 third-party complaint attempts to circumvent the "Guest Statute" on the basis that the respondent was
intoxicated.

Whether or not respondent was intoxicated or guilty

of willful misconduct so as to lose the protection of the "Guest
Statute" has not been determined, and only bears on the issues of
this appeal in determining whether or not the appellants and respondent are joint tort-feasors for purposes of comparing their
negligence as discussed in Point IV of this brief.
The chronology of events as set forth in appellants1
Statement of Facts is substantially correct with the exception that
the Brunyers and the respondent Zigich had been attending a party.
In fact, the Brunyers were guests in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Zigich
and other than the Brunyers and the Zigichs, there was no one else
present.

(See deposition of Emil Zigich, page 17.)

Respondent

disagrees with the appellants1 characterization in his Statement of
Facts of the "Utah Contribution Statute" inasmuch as contribution
among joint tort-feasors is not a separate statute nor an act in and
of itself, but part of and interdependent with the Utah Comparative
Negligence Act, House Bill No. 25, codified in Section 78-27-37 et
seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS1
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND HOLDING THAT UTAH'S COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE ACT DID NOT APPLY TO THE ACTION BEFORE THE
COURT INASMUCH AS THE ACCIDENT WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT AND THE COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE ACT IS NOT RETROACTIVE.
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The automobile accident from which the present litigation
arises occurred on April 14, 1973.

This was twenty-five (25) days

prior to the effective date of the relatively recently adopted Utah
Comparative Negligence Act.

The effective date was May 8, 1973.

It is the respondent's position that the rights and liabilities of all parties to the accident of April 14, 1973, were
fixed as of the time of the accident.

Utah law at the time of the

accident, which is the subject of appellants1 claim for contribution,
did not allow contribution between joint tort-feasors and the later
passage of the Comparative Negligence Act does not retroactively
create a right which was non-existent at the time of the accident.
It is only with the passage of Section 4 of the Comparative
Negligence Act, that contribution is now allowed between joint
tort-feasors.
The state of the law in Utah prior to the effective date
of the Comparative Negligence Act and the law that applied on
April 14, 1973, the date of the plaintiff's injuries, is adamantly
clear; there was no right of contribution between joint tort-feasors.
This Court in the case of Hardman v. Matthews, 1 Utah 2d 110, 262
P2d 748 (1953) held that a defendant tort-feasor had no right to
implead under Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the host
driver of the plaintiff as a party defendant.

In Hardman, there

was an auto collision where a plaintiff guest passenger sued the
driver of the second automobile involved in the accident, claiming
negligence; the defendant claimed that he had a right to join the
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host driver of the plaintiff as a defendant under Rule 14. The
trial court allowed the defendant to join the host driver and on an
intermediate appeal, this Court instructed the trial court to vacate
its order which allowed the joinder.

In so doing, this Court said:

If the negligence of the interpleaded
parties were the sole proximate cause of
the injuries as defendants maintain, the
latter would have a complete defense to
the action without the joinder. If actively
they were jointly or concurrently negligent
with defendants, joinder would avail the
latter nothing since contribution cannot
be had between joint or concurring tortfeasors, in a cTase like this, unless sanctioned by statute, there being none such
in Utah. (Emphasis added.)
Only after the accident for which the appellants seek contribution, did the Legislature sanction by statute, within the
Comparative Negligence Act, contribution between joint tort-feasors;
prior to its effective date no right existed.
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 68-3-3 (1953) entitled nRevised
Statutes not Retroactive" states:

M

No part of these revised statutes

is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."

The Compilers Notes

in explaining the construction and application of this statute state:
"This section is merely a statement of well-settled rules of
statutory construction."

They cite the leading Utah case of Farrel v.

Pingree, 5 Utah 443, 16 Pac. 843.

This case involved the amending

of an act relating to the terms of County Treasurers where the words
"two years" were substituted for the words "four years". At the time
of the Act's passage, the treasurer in office had served nearly two
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years and a new treasurer had been elected to fill the vacancy.
The court held that the amended act could not cut short the incumbent's term from four to two years.
The argument of the plaintiff in the Farrel case that the
amendment should relate back to the date of the incumbent's
election is similar to the appellants1

argument in the case at

bar that the comparative negligence statute should act to allow
contribution to an accident occurring prior to the Act's effective
date.

The Utah Supreme Court's refusal to allow such a construction

in Farrel was proper, and the opinion became influential in the
adoption of 68-3-3 cited supra.

The court stated:

There is no authority or sound reason
for holding that such amendment took
effect as of August, 1884, nearly two
years prior to its enactment. The defendant contends that although the statute
took effect on the day of its passage,
yet that it related back to the August
of 1884, the date of Harris' election.
We are at a loss to know why this is so.
The amendment says nothing whatsoever
about the enactment relating back two
years, or any other time, prior to its
passage, and we see nothing in the amendment upon which to hang an inference of
that nature. We are not justified adding to a statute something that the
legislature never intended, or had in
contemplation in enacting the statute. ...
The statute, with the interpretation
sought to be placed upon it by the defendant, would be clearly retroactive.
No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said
so, and there is no reason why it should
be so, and where the statute is easily
susceptible of another and reasonable
construction.
The general rule, as
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,

found in the books, is even stronger
than we have stated. It is laid down
in Broom's Legal Maxims that flaws
should be construed as prospective, and
not retrospective, unless they are
expressly made applicable to past
transactions, and to such as are still
pending.f ...
It being clear, therefore, that the
legislative intent that the amendment
should be retrospective, does not appear,
it is settled by an overwhelming weight
of authority that the enactment of the
11th of March, 1886, had no retrospective
or retroactive effect, but its operation
is entirely prospective. (Emphasis added.)
Since the Comparative Negligence Act was not expressly made
applicable to past actions and as to those causes of action that were
still pending at the time of its passage, it should only be applied
prospectively.
In Okland Construction Company v. The Industrial Commission,
520 P2d 208 (1974) the Utah Court again had occasion in a workman's
compensation setting to state the general rule as to statutory
application.
It is true, as the employer Okland
contends: that it is entitled to have
its rights determined on the basis of
the law as it existed at the time of
the occurrence; and that a later statute
or amendment should not be applied in a
retroactive manner to deprive a party
of his rights or impose greater liability
upon him.2 ... (footnote 2) This long
established rule is enacted in our
statutes, Sec. 68-3-3, U.C.A. 1953;
In any event, we revert to consideration
of the problem under the statute as it
existed at the time of the accident, and
without concern as to the later amendment.

•'•"•

The statutory adoption of the rule of comparative negligence
by an increasing number of states in recent years, to replace the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

common law rule of contributory negligence, has given rise to the
question whether the statutes adopting such a rule are to be applied
retroactively to accidents which occurred prior to the effective
date of the statute, so as to allow recovery by a plaintiff who was
otherwise barred under the rule of contributory negligence.

The

respondent would respectfully direct the Court's attention to
57 A.L.R. 3d 1458 and its treatment of this issue entitled "Retrospective Application of State Statute Substituting Rule of Comparative
Negligence for that of Contributory Negligence."

The conclusive

observation of the writer of the annotation is as follows:
In accordance with the strict rule of
construction generally against giving
retrospective operation to a statute where
the intention of the legislature is not
stated in express terms, the courts, although not usually alluding to such rule,
have refused retrospective application to
a comparative negligence statute which
was silent to the legislative intent in
the matter.

c

In

all the jurisdictions cited in the annotation, only one

court allowed retroactive application of the comparative negligence
statutes and that was because the statute expressly provided for such
an application, stating that the act would apply to any action in
which the trial was commenced after a specified date.
The majority of the courts, including Wisconsin* from which
the Utah statute was largely derived, have held that the Comparative
Negligence Acts will not be applied retroactively to accidents which
occurred prior to the effective date of the Act, even if the trial
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is after the Act is in effect.

Utah's Comparative Negligence Act

was taken almost verbatim from the Idaho Act adopted by that State
in 1971.

Idaho Code, Sec. 6-801 (Supp. 1973).

The Idaho Comparative

Negligence Act's ancestry can be traced directly to the original
Wisconsin statute, which is found in Wisconsin Statutes Annotated,
Sec. 895.045 (1966), and the Uniform Contribution Among Joint TortFeasor's Act.

It is noteworthy that the Wisconsin courts have held

that the Comparative Negligence Act was not to be applied retroactively.

It is also significant in the case of Wisconsin to note

that it has been the leading proponent of comparative negligence for
the last 42 years.
In Wisconsin, the Comparative Negligence Act was first held
not to be applied retroactively in 1933.

In the case of Brewster v.

Ludtke, 211 Wis. 344, 247 N.W. 449 (1933), the Court denied the
plaintiff recovery for the death of a pedestrian alleged to have
been caused by the negligence of the driver of an automobile when it
stated:
(The decedent)...was therefore as a
matter of law guilty of negligence that
contributed to her death. This constitutes a complete defense, as the collision
occurred before the enactment of the
Comparative Negligence Statute.
Subsequent to the Brewster decision, supra, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held in Crane v. Webber, 211 Wis. 294, 247 N.W. 882
(1933), that where the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
in an auto-train collision occurring Mbefore the enactment of the

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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legislature of the comparative negligence statute" that contributory
negligence is an absolute defense to the action.

As recently as

1972, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Halzem v. Mueller, 54 Wis.
388, 195 N.W. 2d 635 (1972) held that no modification or amendment to
the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Statute was to be applied retroactively.
Since the adoption of comparative negligence in Wisconsin,
numerous states in addition to Utah, have adopted a similar, if not
identical statute, and the majority of those courts in the states
where the statute was adopted have held that comparative negligence
will not be applied retroactively.

The Colorado Supreme Court in

Heafer v. Denver-Boulder Bus Line, 489 P2d 315 (1971) held that the
comparative negligence statute in Colorado shall apply only to actions
arising out of events which occur on or after July 1, 1971, the date
specified in the statute as becoming effective.
given by the court for so doing was:

The policy argument

"Judicial restraint requires

that we honor the prospective application of the statute in the
interest of avoiding unwarranted confusion in pending litigation
involving tort transaction occurring prior to the adoption of the
statute."
The Hawaiian Court in Bissen v. Fujii, 466 P2d 429 (Hawaii
1970), and in Silva v. Oishi, 471 P2d 524 (Hawaii 1970) rejected the
contention that the comparative negligence standard should have been
applied in these cases where plaintiffs were injured in automobile
accidents, holding that since the comparative negligence statute

-10-
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applied on ] y to c] ai us accrui ng after J t took effect, and since
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were not governed by the comparative negligence i tile.

I n Bis sen,

tl le I lawa i :i ai l Coi irt: expressed the same pol i cy as the Colorado Coui t.

. •

,•
(Or.

The statute is effective for tort
claims which accrued after July 1 4 ,
1969, and to adopt the doctrine of
comparative negligence for this case
(prior accident) would create unnecessary and unwarranted confusion in the
law. We should use judicial restraint
and not leave any implication that we
are trying to 'outdo 1 the legislature.
1 he 0r egoi I Supi eme Coi ir I: he] d :i i i. Josep'l I v JLowei y ,

19 5 P2 <i 1 ,"! 7 /> ,
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which occurred prior to the effective date of the new law.
V H S
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'..

Therefore, if applied retroactively,
the act would affect legal rights and
obligations arising out of past actions.
'•••;: ; '• ••. As a result:, strictly for the purposes
under consideration here, the provisions
of the act are 'substantive* and not
'procedural or remedial 1 in nature. If
applied retroactively, the statute
could create a duty to pay which did
• not exist at the time the damage was
inflicted.

-II
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In Joseph,

In addition to the Oregon, Colorado, and Hawaiian courts
of our jurisdiction, many other courts have held their comparative
negligence acts not to be retroactive.
The Maine Court in Moore v. Fenton,

289 A2d 698, (Maine

1972), involving an automobile truck collision occurring prior to
the effective date of their comparative negligence act held:
This case, in which trial was held
on December 28, 1970, was tried by the
parties in the posture that it was governed by the common law doctrine that
any contributory negligence of plaintiff
would bar his recovery (rather than the
statutory modification establishing
comparative causational negligence)
because regardless of the time of the
trial, the events generating the alleged
cause of action had occurred prior to
the statute, ... We treat the case
therefore, as controlled by the common
law of contributory negligence.

• v* ..

The Mississippi Court in Fuller v, Illinois Central R.R. Co.,
100 Miss. 705, 56 So. 783 (1911) held that the newly established
comparative negligence doctrine would be inapplicable to a personal
injury sustained prior to the passage of the act.

See also Jones v.

Jones, 311 A2d 522 (N.H. 1973)
In all of the above cited cases where an accident had
occurred prior to the effective date of the Comparative Negligence Act
and the trial of those cases

came after the effective date of the

Act, the courts refused to give the Act a retroactive construction.
The date of the accident was held to be controlling, such a statutory
construction being the only one consistent with preventing unwarranted
and unnecessary confusion in the law.
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• POINT II

'•

THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT AFFECTS SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND THEREFORE, IF A P P L I E D RETROACTIVELY,
' THE ACT WOULD AFFECT LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
ARISING OUT OF PAST A C T I O N S AND CREATE A DUTY TO
CONTRIBUTE TO A JOINT TORT-FEASOR WHICH DID NOT
•' ' EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION.
.'' ••.' <: • • ' ' T h e a p p e ] 1 a n t s a r g i i e i i i I " o i i 1 !:: 1 1 c • i: 1:1 I e :i i b i :i e I:

f

IIo w e

even,, i £ it were assumed that some retroactive application must occur
tc the date o 6 the accident, such app] ication is p e r m i s s i b 1 e s 1 n c e n o
s u b s t: a n I: :i v e c 1 i a n g e s 1 I a v e o c c u i r e d b > t h e p a s s a g e o £ t h i s a c t '

! 1 I e • ••

respondent submits that the. Comparative Negligence Act does very
m a 1: e r i a 1 11 y e f fe c 1:

ff

s i; xb s 1: ai I 1: :i t ef""' ] aw ai id s i n c e 1:1 I er e wa s

c o n t r i b u t i o n a v a i 1 a b 1 e a t t h e 1: i m e t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d,

'

-•

o i I e cannot

be created at a later date by the adoption of a statute allowing
cc i l ti :i bi iti on.

..

•

'.

.

• . •.

. •• :

The general rule of construction concerning the i nterpretati on of statutes as i t: h a s b e e n a p p 3 1 e d b> 1:he I Jtah S \ i p r e m e Coi 11 t

:i s

t h a t a n a c t a £ £ e c 11 n g s ub s t a n 11 ve r I g h t s w i ] 1 n o t b e g I ve i i r e 11 o a c 11 v e
effect unless the act clearly requires :i I:

i'lie Comparative Negligence

A c I: i s s :i ] e n t a s t: o w 1 i e 1: h e i o i i i o I: i t s h o i i ] d b e a p p ] i e d i e 11 o a : 1: :i \ i e .1! ;
Representati vre of the U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t f s application of the
principle is In re Ingraham f s E s t a t e , 1,06 I Jtah 337, ] 48 I '2d 3 10 (1 9- 1 4),
w h e i e t h i s C o i i r t h e 1 d t h a t a ,J 9 4 3 ] a w a p p 1 > i i I g I: o e s f: a t: e s w a s i I o f:
r e t r o a c t i v e and In so d o i n g s t a t e d : •
That this court is committed to the
general rule can not be questioned, for
in the case of Merc,ur Gold Mining §
Milling Co. v. Spry, County Collector, 16
Utah 222, 52 P. 3 8 2 , 2 8 4 , Judge Miner said:
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'Constitutions, as well as statutes,
should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear
intention that they should have a retroactive effect. This rule of construction
should always be adhered to, unless there
be something on the face of the statute
putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant it to operate retrospectively. Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 73;
Suth. St. Const. , §§ 463-465.f
We are convinced that the general rule
must apply as Sec. 80-12-7, Laws of Utah 1943,
is not a procedural enactment; but is substantive in its effect.
* & *

Had the legislature intended Sec. 80-12-7,
Laws of Utah 1943, to have a retroactive effect,
it is reasonable to suppose they would have
made such a declaration in the amendment.
* * *

We are forced to the conclusion that the intention of the legislature is doubtful and that
Judge Miner's pronouncement of the law, above
"'" mentioned, is applicable to the situation before
us.
* * *

In addition to this court's pronouncements in

In re

Ingraham's Estate, supra., the Utah Code speaks to the question and
provides some direction with respect to construction of Utah State
statutes. In Section 68-3-3, U.C.A. 1953 as amended it states:
68-3-3 Revised statutes not retroactive.-No part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared.
This court's pronouncement on whether or not substantive law
will be given retroactive or prospective application appears
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adamantly clear, and if tl ie Comparati ve Negligence Act. i s subs

na 1: i u e, , i t s h o u ] d i i o t b e app 1 i e d re tr o a c t i ve ] y.
In determining whether or not the Comparati v e Negligence

Act affects substantive law, thi s Coi irt has spoken :i n the case of
Petty v. Clark, 113 1 Itah. 205, 192 P2d 5

•

Ii l tl i. i t c:< \ s -e,

,

the Court i n de £ in i n g s ub s t an t ive 1aw stat e d:
Substantive law is defined as the
positive law which creates, defines and
regulates the rights and duties of the
parties and which may give rise to a
cause of a c t i o n , as distinctive from
adjective law w h i c h pertains to and p r e scribes the practice and procedure or
the legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made
. effective.
From the above definition, tl ie respondent .asserts that the
e 1 ements o£ the Comparat:i ve Neg 1 igence A c t , inc] udi ng that portion of
11 i e Act whic h pe r t a i n s to cont ribut i on am on g.j oi nt t ort - £e a so r s
dramatically effects the substantive law lal d down I n Hardman v.
Matthews , supra.

Ihe ( ompa ra f J ve Negligence A* t material h

affects

the impact of contributory negligence in contribution between joint
tort-feasors as if existed prior to the effective date oi the A c t ,
The LoJiipaiM I, no* Negligence Ac I hirMn. » letlefines and regulali 1 llir
rights and responsibjII ties of tort-teasers and allows n cause of
acti on lor contribution between joint tort-feasois wlieie none existed
under prior law of contributory negligence.
In an article in the Utah Law Review, V o l . 1 9 7 3 , Fa] 1 No. 3,
bv Professor Wayne Tftodc at page 43'1 if states:

-15-

.• . \
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VI.

Effective Date of Comparative
Negligence Act.

A general rule of construction applied
by the Utah Supreme Court is that an
act affecting substantive rights will
not be given retroactive effect unless
the act clearly commands that this be
done. The Comparative Negligence Act,
affecting the substantive law of contributory negligence and contribution
between joint tort-feasors, contains
no provision for retroactive application.
The Act applies, therefore, only to
claims that arose 60 or more days after
March 8, 1973, the date of adjournment
of the 1973 Legislature. (Emphasis added.)
The statutory interpretation of what constitutes substantive
law as applied by the Utah Courts is in accord with general statements
of the law as set forth in 18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution, Sec. 45 p.65:
. . .the right of a joint tortfeasor to
contribution from his cotortfeasors is
a matter of substantive law which, in
diversity suits, is controlled by state,
and not federal, law.
Further, in 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, Sec. 350, p. 487, the
work discusses general rules of statutory interpretation with regard
to prospective or retrospective application as follows:
The question of whether a statute
operates retrospectively, or prospectively only, is one of legislative
intent. In determining such intent,
courts observe a strict rule of construction against a retrospective operation,
and indulge in the presumption that
the legislature intended statutes, or
amendments thereof, enacted by it, to
operate prospectively only, and not
retroactively. However, a contrary
determination will be made where the
intention of the legislature to make
a statute retroactive is stated in
express terms, or is clearly, explicitly,
positively, unequivocally, unmistakably,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and unambiguously shown by necessary
implication or by terms which permit
no other meaning to be annexed to
them, and which preclude all question
in regard thereto, and leave no reasonable doubt thereof.
It is especially true that a statute
or amendment will be regarded as operating prospectively only, where it is
in derogation of a common law right, or
where the effect of giving it a retroactive operation would be to interfere
with an existing contract, destroy a
vested right, or create a new liability
Tn connection with a past transaction,
invalidate a defense which was good when
the statute wa~passed, or in general,
render the statute or amendment unconstitutional. (Emphasis added.)
Since there was no ri ght to conti :i bu t:i 01 1 betwe ei 1 jc :i i 1 1: toi I: •
feasors in tit ih as of the time o f the accident as noted in Hardman v.
fn \ I I mi t h< appelJ ants to obtai n contribution from.

Matthew,' , i up i a

the respondent and retroactively apply tl le Comparative Negligence A c t
w o u l d b e to create a n e w liability ii i connects on with the past

f i ansae I* i on ami won! I invalidate a iJolVnsc as .tiiiony i o 1111 inrt fVa • i s
regarding joinder and impleader which was good before the sta tute w a s •
passed,

^

•

' .. ' •

Inasmuch as tl le Comparative Negligence A c t affects substan I::it \i e
law both in comparing, negligence of joint tort -'feasors as to a
p I rim f I IT and IM I I li n ^ a r d I <> conf r i.buti on between j oint tort feasors ,
and since the act contains no express provision 01 even an implied
intent that it should be applied retroactively, the A c t should b e
applied prospective] y.

'

.•

1 7

••'•.- y

'.

••
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The case of Joseph v. Lowery, 495 P2d 273 (Ore. 1972) is
illustrative of the above principles.

In the Joseph case, the

Supreme Court of Oregon held that dispite the fact that the trial
of an automobile accident case was held after the effective date of
the new Comparative Negligence Law, the trial court erred in applying
the law of comparative negligence to the accident which occurred
prior to the effective date of the law.

The Oregon statute, like

Utah's, was mainly derived from Wisconsin's statute and was silent
as to the time of its application.

The Oregon Court held that the

statute was substantive and refused to give it retroactive effect
since it would thereby affect the legal rights and obligations
arising out of past actions.

The Court stated:

There is no provision in the statute
which either requires or prohibits its
retroactive application. However,
statutes other than those which are
procedural or remedial in nature are
applied prospectively in the absence
of direction to the contrary. ...
Under the comparative negligence statute,
a plaintiff whose negligence is less
than that of the defendant is not
barred from recovery by virtue of his
contributory negligence, but is allowed
recovery reduced by the degree of his
fault. Therefore, if applied retroactively, the act would effect legal
rights and obligations arising out of
past actions. As a result, strictly for
the purposes under consideration here,
the provisions of the act are 'substantive1 and not 'procedural or remedial' in nature. If applied retroactively,
the statute would create a duty to pay
which did not exist at the time the
damage was inflicted.
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In the J o s e p h c a s e , the p l a i n t 1 ff, i i i a s i m i l a r . f a s h ion to

fully that: the doctri lie o f v e s t e d ri ght h a d n o appl ication to a

=.. •

:

c h a n g e i n 1 a w g o v e r n ii n g a c a i i s e o f a c t :i o n b a s e d u p o n c o m m o n 3 a w

r e t r o a c t i v e a p p 1 i c a t i o n i n v o 1 v e d i I o t: o n 2 y p r e j u d i c i a 11 > a f f e c t i n g

v e s t e d r :i g h 1: s , I: • i i I: a 1! s ::: I: I I e • II = • g a 11 c h a r a c t e i ::) I: f • a s 1: I: r a n s a c t il o n s • '
The Court stated:
'•"' -

r

.'

While all ...vested rights may b e
considered substantive for present
• •
purposes, it does n o t necessarily
•: '
fall that tl le only subject m a t t e r
that is c o n s i d e r e d s u b s t a n t i v e is
that w h i c h relates to v e s t e d r i g h t s .
Our decisions a r e clear that statutes
w h i c h have n o t affected, v e s t e d rights
have been denied r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i cation. W h e t h e r v e s t e d rights a r e
'.'• .; ..
a f f e c t e d is n o t the sole criterian
used in Oregon in d e t e r m i n i n g if a
p a r t i c u l a r statute is to b e g:i ven
retroactive application
..•/.'./";.. • - E v e i i :i II: :i I: i i e •! e t::i : i i = •. a s 1:1 ic: appe] 1 a i i its a s s e i t,, itl la 1: 1:1 le - ' .
respondent cannot c 1 aim t h a t t h e r e was a tim.e 11 Iat a r i g 1 It: t o be
free from liabi lity 1 lad v e s t e d , then the statute still ma ;) i lot b e

of past transactions are prejudiced.

•

: .

'•••...'

Final 1 y, the Oregon Si lpreme Coin I i n .Iosej>h_v^ I iOjwei ) , supra ,
vo. 1 ced poli c> arguments as to t) e p a r t y ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s o f liabili ty
w h i c h appear to b e parti cular] >
Court

Tl i"e • C >" / i ! i > I: ,< ite< I :

.. ...

i elevai it in tl le case n o w b e f o r e the
.'..•.-•

• . • •. •'- ' . • • ••;::: ' '
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Certainly, no one has an accident
upon the faith of the then existing
law. However, it would come as a shock
to someone who has estimated his probable liability arising from a past
accident, and who has planned his
affairs accordingly, to find that his
responsibility, therefore, is not to
be determined as of the happening of
the accident, but is also dependent
upon what the legislature might subsequently do. Every day it is neces/;••-..• V ••'•-:-:-^ y.^' sary in the conduct of the affairs of
individuals and of businesses to make
a closely calculated estimate of the
responsibility or lack thereof resulting from an accident or from other
unforeseen or unplanned circumstances
and to act in reliance upon such
estimate. We believe there is merit
in the prior view of this court, as
demonstrated by its decisions, that,
in the absence of an indication to the
contrary, legislative acts should not
be construed in a manner which changes
legal rights and responsibilities
arising out of transactions which
occur prior to the passage of such acts.

}

1

The third-party plaintiff relies heavily upon the case of
Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. Industrial Commission, 2 Utah 2d
1, 268 P2d 689 (1954), as analogous to the present case.

The Silver

King case has no application to the present action for a number of
reasons.
Silver King involved a claim for the death of a workman
and the question of whether or not the cause of action for his death
asserted by his heirs under workman's compensation arose under an
earlier two years statute or a statute which was in effect at the
time of his death providing for five years.

Under the workman's
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c o in p e n s a t :i o n s I: a 1:1 11 e s , i 11 I i c 1 i w e i e :i i I e f f e c t w h e n t: h e d e c e a s e d left
h i s emp 1 oymen t, i £ dea 1:1 I o c cur r e d £r om s 1.1 i co s i s w 11 h in two years
a c 1 a :i m w o \ 11 d b e ho n o r e d b y t h e I n d u s t r :i a 1 C omm i s s I o n.

Prioi to

t h i s d e a 11 i o i: t: 1 I e e m p ] o y e e , 1:1 I e 1: :i in. e p e i I o d w a s e x t e n d e d t o • E ii v e

..

years , The employee died from silicosis at a ti me whei I tl le fi ve -..'
y e a r ] i in :i t a t :i o n w a s :i n e f £ e c 1:.

I h i s C o u i t 1 i e 1 d t: h a t t h e c a u s e o £

action arose at the death of tl le employee and as t h e fi v e y ear

:

'•'

statute was in effect at the time of hi s d e a t h , w h e n the cause of
action a rose.

tl lat O we yeai 1 in i:i ta ti oi i app] i ed.

. - • • •• ,

;

The employer argued that the employ e e f s cause o£ acti o n -.•...:•'
under the w o r k m a n f s compensation p r o v i s i o n s came Into existence at
t h e 11 in e t h e e in p 1 o y e e ] e f t 1 I i s e in p ] o > m e i I I:

'I ' 1 I i s C o i 11 f: i e j e c t: e d 11 i a

argument and held that the cause of acti on for death arose w h e n the
death occi IT red

.

•

•• . •:

Ii I the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n , appellan ts 1 claim, for conti i buti on,
comes into e f f e c t , if there i s such a i i gl it, at: the time of the
a c c i d e n 1: w h :i c h p r o d i i c e s p 1 a i n !:: i f f f s c 1 a i in a g a 11 i s t 1 I i in

!
:
l
i

s I: h e r e . •' .

was no r1ght of contribution w h e n the 1nstant accIdent occuri ed, the
ap p e 1 1 an t s h a v e n o c ] a 1 in b e c a us e c o n t r 1 b u t i o n d i d n o t e x i s 1: wl i e n
11 I e i i c a i i s e o f a c 1: i o i I w o i i ] < 1 1 I a i ; e I: o a r i s e,

••

T1 i i s C o i 11 t i J :> i i .1! d 1 i a \ €

t: o ap p 1 y t h e C o mp a r a 11 v e Neglige n c e A c t i e t r o a c 11 v e 1 y t o c r e a t e a
cause oi action wheiu xiou.

„\> >t\ ^ ^ n u x

di fe^n<~^ b e t w e e n S i l v e r King .i. ,
cause , : ... i: H, . . . ^ J ^ .
II

" •

-

L, **»•
' '

L U inc ^ L . "1 he p r i n c i p a l ••

^e ^ r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n is wl len tl le

,.-:•<;

. , ,, u »
*'
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;use o(* a c t i o n ,
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fi f L Oil) |'

*

:
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negligence and in Silver King the cause of action arose after the
statute was effective.
Appellants also cite the case of Augustus v. Bean, 14
Cal.Rptr. 641, 363 P2d 873 (1961) in support of their position
that they are entitled to contribution even though the accident,
which is the subject of this litigation, occurred prior to the
effective date of Utah's Comparative Negligence Act, A review of the
decision in Augustus v. Bean will show that both the parties seeking
contribution and the party from whom contribution was sought, were
named as co-defendants by the plaintiff Augustus in the principal
action.

That set of facts is totally different than the facts in

the instant litigation where the plaintiff Brunyer has not named as
a defendant the respondent Zigich.

Additionally, the California

Court was construing a statute which is substantially different
than Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute.

Section 875 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, which the California Court construes, states that
contribution lies where a money judgment has been rendered jointly
against two or more defendants in a tort action and one of them has
paid more than his prorata share of that judgment.

In the present

litigation, as the plaintiff has elected not to name Zigich as a codefendant, which was his right under the Utah law effective at the
time of the accident, there can be no judgment rendered jointly in
this case against both appellants and respondent.
California Court, in holding as it did, stated that their
cbnstruction of Section 8 75 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
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did not give rise to a problem of retroactive impairment of a vested
right inasmuch as at the time of the accident, prior to adoption of
Section 875, a person did not have a vested right at common law to
avoid paying for the consequences of his negligence.

That statement

by the California Court is true if a party seeking contribution and
the party from whom contribution is sought are both defendants in
the principal action.

Where the respondent Zigich has not been

named as a defendant and as the statute of limitations for at least
a portion of BrunyerVs principal lawsuit, to wit:

the wrongful

death claim has run as against this defendant, requiring this respondent to contribute to a judgment which represents damages for
wrongful

death where no action could be maintained under any circum-

stances against the plaintiff regardless of the guest statute because
the statute of limitations has run.
POINT III
THE SECTIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT,
WHICH ALLOW CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN JOINT TORTFEASORS DOES NOT CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
CONTRIBUTION, BUT RATHER RIPENS AN INCHOATE
RIGHT FOR CONTRIBUTION IF, AND ONLY IF, THE LAW
WHICH APPLIES AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT PROVIDES
FOR CONTRIBUTION.
Appellants argue that the cause of action for contribution
arises when he has been sued by the plaintiff.

As the appellants

were sued by the plaintiff after the effective date of the Comparative
Negligence Act, the appellants contend that this Court would not be
retroactively applying the Comparative Negligence Act were it to
-23Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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allow contribution in this instance.

Even under comparative

negligence, a cause of action for contribution, which one tortfeasor may have against another, arises at the time of the accident.
Prior to the effective date of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act,
there was no contribution, and accordingly, no right can exist
even at a later time.

,

The right of contribution, if one exists,

is created at the time of the accident and vests when one tortfeasor by judgment pays more than his prorata share thereof.

Had

this accident occurred after the effective date of the Comparative
Negligence Act, then the appellants1 right for contribution and
cause of action therefor would have been an inchoate right from the
date of the accident until such time as he paid more than his
prorata share of a judgment to the plaintiff.

The payment of more

than a prorata share is the instrumentality which vests the inchoate
right.
In 18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution, Sec. 45, p. 65, the
author discusses, "Prerequisites to, and Accrual of, Right to
Recover Contribution."

"If, in accordance with the principles

\

discussed above a right to recover contribution is available as
among joint tort-feasors, the prerequisites to the accrual of that
right and of the corresponding obligation to contribute are the
same, generally speaking, as in contribution cases generally."
This section of Am Jur goes on to discuss inchoate rights.
The discussion in this section is predicated upon the basis that,
"If ... a right to recover contribution is available as among
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joint tort-feasors...", then certain inchoate rights to contribution
arise at the time of the accident which ripen into an enforceable
claim after judgment and payment of more than the prorata share by
one joint tort-feasor.

But in the case at bar, the accident

occurred prior to the Comparative Negligence Act and as such, there
was no available right to recover contribution among joint tortfeasors and a right that never exists, can, of course, never vest.
18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution, Sec. 47, p. 66, states:
It is important to note, however, the
distinction between the accrual of the
right to recover contribution and the
inchoate right to contribution before
payment or discharge of the common liability. Even though a cause of action
for contribution does not become complete
until the claimant's act of payment or
discharge of more than his equitable
share of the common liability, generally
a right to be protected against an
unfair exaction--an incidental or inchoate
right to compel contribution-comes into
being and becomes the property right or
interest of a tort-feasor the instant
the joint or concurring acts of him?e"lf
and other tort feasors give to the injured
person a cause of action against them-in other words, when the common liability
arises. Such right is in a sense an
incident which follows the principal
event out of which the injured person's
cause of action arises, and once in
being, although contingent, subordinate,
or inchoate, it is nonetheless real
and subsisting, and has an existence
in contemplation of law until it is no
longer needed as a resource to which
the joint tort feasor may look for relief
from an imposition upon him of an inequitable share of the burden on account
of the joint tort, provided he does
not in the meantime waive or give up
such right. This inchoate right arises
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as soon as the acts of the joint
wrongdoers raise the injured person's
cause of action against them, it doe"?
not depend upon an action against
them being commenced. (Emphasis added.)
This section of Am Jur points out that a right to contribution comes into existence at the time of the accident and that
if an inchoate right for contribution is created at the time of
the accident, should the law allow contribution at the time of
the accident, then the inchoate right vests when a tort-feasor
pays more than his prorata share. Accordingly, applied to the
facts of this case, appellants did not even have an inchoate right
to enforce against the respondent.
Appellants suggest to this Court that the trial court erred
in catagorization in the order of dismissal with regard to the
"Comparative Negligence ActM (p. 7 Appellants1 Brief) and suggests
that the right of contribution between joint tort-feasors is a
separate, distinct and unrelated statute.

The changing of Utah!s

prior law to comparative negligence from common law principles of
contributory negligence was contained in House Bill No. 25
entitled Utah Comparative Negligence Act.

The Act was codified into

the Utah Code from Section 78-27-37 to 78-27-43. A copy of that
bill as passed by the Legislature is attached to this brief as
Appendix I.
In reviewing the bill as passed, it will be noted that
contribution between joint tort-feasors is contained in the
"Comparative Negligence Act" as section 4.

Contribution is an

integral part of comparative negligence and cannot be severed and
called the "Utah Contribution Statute" in an attempt to convince
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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this Court that retroactive application of contribution would not be
retroactive application of the principles of comparative negligence
itself.

Contribution between joint tort-feasors, except in special

circumstances not applicable here, did not exist prior to the inception of comparative negligence and contribution cannot exist
without it.

The appellants' statement that the trial court improperly

characterized the provisions dealing with contribution as the
"Comparative Negligence Act" is incorrect.
POINT IV

•>

EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE APPELLANTS
HAVE A RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION IN THIS INSTANCE
WHERE THE ACCIDENT GOVERNING THE RIGHTS OF THE
PARTIES OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT, THE APPELLANTS
AND RESPONDENT ARE NOT JOINT TORT-FEASORS FOR
THE PURPOSES OF CONTRIBUTION IN THAT THEIR LIAv B I L I T Y IS NOT COMMON.
•The depositions which are exhibits to the record in this

matter and the record on appeal show that the plaintiff, Ralph Brunyer,
and his wife, Louise Brunyer, were guest passengers in the automobile
operated by respondent, Emil Zigich.
It is clear that in Utah, a guest passenger in an automobile
may not sue, nor may a guest passenger have any recovery, from his
host driver in the absence of intoxication or willful misconduct on
the part of the host driver.

There is no recovery by a guest

passenger against a host driver for ordinary or simple negligence.
The standard of care that the Legislature, by adopting the Utah
Guest Statute, as found in Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended, is substantially less than the standard of care required
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of third persons who are responsible to a guest for simple or
ordinary negligence,

Utah's Comparative Negligence Act only allows

contribution between joint tort-feasors and notes that their liability must be common.

The applicable section reads:

78-27-39. Contribution among joint
tort-feasors--Discharge of common liability by joint tort-feasor required.-(1) The right of contribution shall
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a
joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled
to a money judgment for contribution
until he has, by payment, discharged
the common liability or more than his
prorata share thereof. (Emphasis added.)
The complaint that has been filed by Ralph Brunyer on behalf
of himself and for the wrongful death of his wife against Salt Lake
County and Daniel Ipson is based upon ordinary or simple negligence,
whereas, any claim that can be made by the plaintiff against the
respondent Zigich, his host driver, must be based upon intoxication
or willful misconduct.

Needless to say, intoxication or willful

misconduct is substantially beyond simple or ordinary negligence.
This Court has clearly set forth the nature of the conduct that must
be attributable to a host driver before a guest passenger may recover
from him.

This Court has ruled that the conduct required is beyond

gross negligence and by the terms of the statute itself indicates
that the conduct must be of a willful or intentional nature.

In the

case of Milligan v. Harward, 11 U2d 74, 355 P2d 62 (1960), this
Court noted that "willful misconduct" must be an intentional act.
...Wilful misconduct is the intentional doing of an act or intentional
omitting or failing to do an act, with
knowledge that serious injury is a
probable and not merely a possible
result, or the intentional doing of an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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act with wanton and reckless disregard of the possible consequences.
Wilful misconduct cannot be predicated upon mere inadvertence or
even gross negligence.
Because of the differences in the nature and character of
the activities required of a host driver or a third party, the
respondent and appellants respectively in this case, there is no
common liability between them.

The activities of the host driver

fall into the catagory of an intentional tort where the activities
of a third party, the appellants in this case, are in the catagory
of an unintentional tort or simple negligence.

Because of this

difference, their activities cannot be compared and contribution
will not lie. A finder of fact can only compare, under Utah's
Comparative Negligence Act, the negligent activities of the joint
tort-feasors.

Intoxication, or willful misconduct and simple

negligence cannot be compared.
The appellants in their memorandum of points and authorities
in opposition to the respondent's motion to dismiss at the trial
court level suggests to the trial court that it interpret common
liability to mean whether or not the plaintiff may have a legally
recognized remedy against both the party seeking contribution and
the party for whom contribution is sought.

The respondent submits

that the question of common liability in comparing the activities
of two alleged joint tort-feasors is much more complex than merely
determining whether or not a plaintiff might have a cause of action
regardless of its nature against multiple defendants.

The nature

and type of the acts and the theories of recovery must be considered
in determining whether or not common liability is present.
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Equal availability of recovery against possible defendants does not create common liability.

The nature of the act

*•'•' of the potential defendants as to the plaintiff must be similar,
at least the activities of the potential defendants as to the
plaintiff must fall into the catagory of negligence, not one in the
catagory of intentional tort and the other in the catagory of
negligence, before common liability can exist.

To compare

negligence of two tort-feasors, both tort-feasors must be
negligent.

The standard of conduct that is required of them as

to the plaintiff must be the same.
POINT V
APPELLANTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION FROM
RESPONDENT AS TO THOSE PORTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIMS AGAINST APPELLANTS FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF
LOUISE BRUNYER IN THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH HAS RUN AS TO THE RESPONDENT.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the guest statute is not a
bar to an action by the plaintiff against the respondent for the
wrongful death of Louise Brunyer, a claim for wrongful death must
be brought within two years from the date of death.
78-12-28. Within two years.-Within two years:
*

fi

it

(2) An action to recover
damages for the death of one
caused by the wrongful att or
neglect of another.
Any claim that the plaintiff, Ralph Brunyer, may have for
the wrongful death of his wife, Louise Brunyer, is barred as to
the respondent Zigich by the statute of limitations, regardless of
whether the respondent was negligent, intoxicated or guilty of willful
misconduct.
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As respondent can have no liability to the plaintiff
for the wrongful death allegations of his complaint, because of the
statute of limitations, the appellants cannot circumvent the lack
of liability between respondent and the plaintiff by a third-party
complaint for contribution due to the statute of limitations.
As the respondent has no liability to the plaintiff,
there can be no common liability between the appellants and the
respondent as to the wrongful death allegations of the plaintiff's
complaint.
The situation where a statute of limitations has run
is analogous to the issue where a defendant and third-party
plaintiff attempts to circumvent the guest statute under the
guise of contribution and comparative negligence.

In situations

involving the guest statute, the Courts considering the issue have
uniformly held that any defenses that a third-party defendant may
have against the plaintiff work as a defense to contribution
and what the plaintiff cannot do directly, the third-party
plaintiff cannot do indirectly.
The cases concerning attempts to circumvent a defense
such as the guest statute are collected in 26 A.L.R. 3d 1283.
As with the guest statute defense, the Courts, in cases of
workman's compensation, where a defendant has attempted to bring
in as a third-party defendant for the purposes of contribution an
employer or fellow servant where that employer's or fellow servant's
liability has been discharged under workman's compensation laws,
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have uniformly held that no right of contribution exists.
Representative of those workman's compensation cases is Beal v.
Southern Union Gas Co., 62 N.M. 38, 304 P2d 566 (1956),

Where

the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a proposed third-party
defendant employer had no obligation to contribute to a
defendant who was sued by an employee for negligence, in that
workman's compensation was not only a bar to the employee but also
a bar to a third-party seeking contribution against the employer
as a result of a suit between the employee and the third person.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that appellants' third-party complaint
was properly dismissed in that the Comparative Negligence Act in
materially affecting substantive law should not be retroactively
applied to this case in that the accident which established the
rights and responsibilities, or the lack of them, occurred prior
to the effective date of the Act.

The appellants' claim for

contribution being an integral part of comparative negligence
should not be given retroactive effect which would occur
appellants had

no right to contribution

in that

when the rights and

liabilities of the parties were established.

Finally, the

appellants and respondent are not joint tort-feasors with common
liability because plaintiff has no claim against this respondent
due to the statute of limitations for wrongful death and there
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is no common liability because of the difference in degree of the
/

acts that appellants are attempting/to compare.
Respectfully Submitted,

•/Sft
/

TIMOTHY R

HA/SON, WADSWORTH O*US£0N
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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DELIVERED two copies of the foregoihg Respondent's
Brief on Appeal to counsel for Appellants/this 2 3rd day of
February, 1976.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-**4-

x,^
• . c ^ v - " ^ - S.

< «

- » .•

Mil'

•v,7 "tfJJHi^S

??•" DTgllUUL **1A* IgTTZT "^ & * '^^^^^^i^^^^m^A^MA^'
U ^ S :*«^

-^^^^^Hi.^
ferrirtarg cf Slat*** ©fftr*

I, CLYDE L. MILLER, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT the attached Engrossed copy of House Bill #25,
(UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT) is a true and correct copy of the
original bill passed by the 1973 Utah State Legislature and signed
by Governor Calvin L. Rampton on March 19, 1973.

of record

AS APPEARS

IN MY OFFICE.

I N W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , 1 HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND
AND AFFIXED THE GREAT SEAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH
17 t h

AT SALT LAKE CITY. THIS
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1973
(UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Engrossed Copy
H.B. No. 25

By C. DeMont Judd, Jr\

AM ACT RELATING TO ACTIONS FOR THE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS BASED ON
NEGLIGENCE OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE; REMOVING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS
A BAR TO ANY RECOVERY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; PROVIDING FOR THE
.

DIMINISHING OF ANY RECOVERY IN PROPORTION TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
PERSON SEEKING RECOVERY; PROVIDING FOR SEPARATE JUDGMENTS AS TO

• DAMAGES AND PROPORTIONATE NEGLIGENCE; PROVIDING FOR CONTRIBUTION AMONG
JOINT TORTFEASORS; PROVIDING FOR THE RELEASE OF ONE OR MORE JOINT
TORTFEASORS WITHOUT RELEASING THEM ALL; AND PROVIDING FOR THE EFFECT
OF SUCH RELEASES ON OTHER JOINT TORTFEASORS.

Be it enacted by the Legislature

of the State of Utah:

Section 1. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an
action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to person
or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence or gross
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.

As used in this act, "contributory

negligence" includes "assumption of the risk11.
Section 2. The court may, and when requested by any party shall,
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining (1) the total
amount of damages suffered and (2) the percentage of negligence attributable
to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of the damages in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person seeking
recovery.
Section 3. (1) The right of contribution shall exist among joint
tortfeasors, but a joint tortfeasor shall not be entitled to a money
judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged the common
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Engrossed Copy
H.B. No. 25
liability or more than his pro rata share thereof.
Section 4.

(1) A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with

the injured person shall not be entitled to recover contribution from another
joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished
by that settlement.
(.2) When there is a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors
to an extent that it would render inequitable an equal distribution

by

contribution among them of their common liability, the relative degrees
of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their
pro rata shares, solely for the purpose of determining their rights of
contribution among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the
injured person for the whole injury as at common law.
(3) As used in this section, "joint tortfeasor" means one of tv/o or
more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to
person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all
or some of them.
Section 5.

Nothing in this act shall affect:

(1) The common law liability of the several joint tortfeasors to
have judgment recovered, and payment made, from them individually by the
injured person for the whole injury.

However, the recovery of a judgment by

the injured person against one joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other
joint tortfeasors.
(2) Any right of indemnity which may exist under present law,
(3) Any right to contribution or indemnity arising from contract
or agreement.
Section 6.

A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor,

whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors,
unless the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other
tortfeasors by the greater of:

(1) The amount of the consideration paid

for that release; or (2) the amount or proportion by which the release
provides that the total claim shall be reduced.
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Engrossed Copy
H.B. No. 25 '.;
Section 7.

(1) A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor

does not relieve him From liability to make contribution to another joint
tortfeasor unless that release:
(a) Is given before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure

a _ .

money judgment for contribution has accrued; and
(b) Provides for a reduction* to the extent of the pro rata

shzra

of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable
against all the other tortfeasors.

.

.,.-,;

(2) This section shall apply only if the issue of proportionate fault
is litigated betv/een joint tortfeasors in the same action.
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